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The Person in Imagination or Persona
Ficta of the Corporation
Maximilian Koessler*
I. Introduction
The history of the person in imagination or persona ficta can
be traced back to the Middle Ages. In the law of the Catholic
Church, this sinister child of conceptualistic thought sprang up
from case law concerning certain concrete legal problems that
had high actuality in those days. It was originally a figure of
speech: the metaphoric expression for a dogmatic fiction1 which
was believed to be needed for a functional purpose. It should
help to recuperate a convenient lawyer's tool, possessed, under
different names, by the Roman law, 2 but forgotten by subsequent
generations. Reference is herewith made to the possibility of at-
taching the status of separate legal entity or of a rights and duties
bearing unit3 to something which is not a human individual, but
an organization of several human beings or a human institution.
Perhaps it is well to remember in this connection that legal per-
sonality is not a necessary adjunct of the physical existence of a
human individual.4 On the other hand, law may attribute this
capacity to a social organism or to a social institution, in other
words, to something different from a human individual.
When the dogmatic fiction, personifying separate legal entities
other than human individuals, had conquered the legal world,
the term "person," originally the exclusive designation of man,
came in addition to mean any rights and duties bearing unit.5
* Member, New York Bar; Legal Division, Office of the Military Govern-
ment for Bavaria.
1. Against the use of dogmatic fictions in law, see Bentham, The Theory
of Legislation (Ogden's edition, London, 1931) 71, 74. Cf. however, Vaihinger,
Die Philosophie des Als Ob (9 and 10 ed., Leipsig, 1927) xxiv, cited with ap-
proval by Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Sciences (1928) 33, 34.
2. Sohm, Institutionen, Geschichte und System des Roemischen Priva-
trechts (17 ed., Munich and Leipzig, 1923) 200; Buckland, Textbook of Roman
Law,,(2 ed., Cambridge, 1932) 175; Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and
Common Law (Cambridge, 1936) 52; 2 Savigny, System des Heutigen Roe-
mischen Rechts (Berlin, 1840) 241, n. 3.
3. On the corresponding German term "Rechtssubjekt," see Jellinek,
Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin, 1900) 150, 151.
4. Illustrated by the institution of slavery. Young, Foreign Companies
and other Corporations (Cambridge, England, 1912) 51; Weber, Rechtssocio-
logie (2 ed., Tuebingen, 1925) 439; Seagle, The Quest for Law (1941) 267.
5. Plucknett, Words (1928) 14 Corn. L.Q. 263, 266; Neckam, The Person-
ality Conception of the Legal Entity (1938) 49.
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In the lawyer's vocabulary, the moral or juristic person6 was thus
added to the natural person. It is clear that at this stage of the
development, "person," even if used with regard to an entity
different from a human individual, ceased to be a metaphor, but
was a plain reference to something existing as it was referred to,
without any figure of speech involved. At this time, "the ques-
tion whether the juristic person is real or imaginary should never
have been seriously advanced. '7 Rather should the phrase "per-
sona ficta" or its equivalent in modern language have been jetti-
soned as an intellectual ballast, as something which had become
obsolete by losing its original sense.
However, lawyers are a conservative kind of people, sticking
to traditions of their art as long as possible, and unfortunately too
long in most cases. Instead of recognizing the obsoleteness of the
conception of a fictitious personality of the corporation or of the
juristic person, the attempt was made to vindicate its preserva-
tion by philosophical speculations which, it is believed, did not
promote, rather in some respects impaired, the free flow of sound
legal thought. One of the unfortunate offsprings of this sophisti-
cated approach to problems which should have been solved with
an open view of the realities involved is the still prevailing law
that a corporation is no citizen in terms of the "privileges and
immunities" clause of the United States Constitution.8 Similar
and equally unnecessary difficulties arose from the same source
in the field of diplomatic protection of stockholder interests
abroad.9
II. The Father of the Corporate Fiction
Under the impact of the penetrating historical studies of the
6. The phrase "moral person" is with preference used by French and
other Romanic legal writers. However, since it certainly has nothing to do
with morality, Savigny considered it as misleading and suggested its replace-
ment by "juristic person" which phrase is now commonly used by Germanic
lawyers. 2 Savigny, System des Heutigen Roemischen Rechts (Berlin, 1840)
240, 241, n. 27.
7. Albrecht's translation of Joseph Kohler, Philosophy of Law (New
York, 1921) 68. But cf. Ehrlich, Juristische Logik (Tuebinger, Germany, 1925)
259, according to whom "the juristic person is a systematic abstraction which
exists only in lectures and in legal textbooks, but not in real life." (Writer's
translation.)
8. Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Con-
stitutional Law (1918). In spite of his brilliant criticism, the doctrine still
prevails. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, North Dakota, 326 U. S. 207, 66
S.Ct. 61, 90 L.Ed. 6 (1945).
9. This topic will be covered in a dissertation entitled "Jurisprudential
Handicaps in the Diplomatic Protection of Stockholder Interests Abroad"
which the writer is preparing in his capacity as candidate for the Ph.D.
degree at Columbia University.
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famous German scholar Otto von Gierke, 0 it has become undis-
puted that the conception of the imaginative personality of a
corporation or juristic person appeared for the first time in the
writings of an Italian jurist, Sinibaldus Fliscus (de Flisco or
Fiesco), who is however better known as Innocent IV under
which name he was Pope between 1243 and 1254.1 In his Appara-
tus, a commentary of the five books of decretals of Pope Gregory
IX,12 Innocent IV, in accordance with the method generally fol-
lowed at that time, decided certain practical questions in a casu-
istic way, but with general observations destined to' rationalize
the results reached. It is mainly to two passages of this treatise
that the origin of the corporate fiction theory is traced by those
who consider him its father. In the one, the rule was announced
that when an ecclesiastical corporation of the type called a col-
lege (collegium) was supposed to deliver an oath, it had the
option of doing this in the form of an oath sworn by a single
person, representing the college, rather than in the form of oaths
respectively sworn by the several members of the corporation.
It is in this connection that the Pope, as rationale of his decision,
used those often quoted words: "since the College is in corporate
matters figured as a person."'1 In the other of the two passages,
10. His main work, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht appeared in in-
stalments under the following titles. Vol. I: Rechtsgeschichte der Deutschen
Genossenschaft (Berlin, 1868); Vol. II: Geschichte des Deutschen Koerper-
schaftsbegriffes (Berlin, 1873); Vol. III: Die Staats-und Korporationslehre
des Altertums und des Mittelalters und Ihre Aufnahme in Deutschland
(Berlin, 1881); Vol. IV: Die Staats-und Korporationslehre der Neuzeit (Ber-
lin, 1915). Other pertinent publications are Johannes Althusius und die En-
twicklung der Naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien (Breslau, 1880); Genossen-
schaftstheorie und die Deutsche Rechtsprechung (Berlin, 1887); Deutsches
Privatrecht (Leipzig, 1895); Juristische Person in II/1 Holtsendorff's Recht-
slexikon (2 ed., Leipzig, 1875) 844; Das Wesen der Menschlichen Verbaende
(Berlin, 1902) (a lecture).
Only part of the foregoing publications is available in English. Maitland,
Dr. Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages (Cambridge, England,
1 ed. 1900) is an English version of part of 3 Genossenschaftsrecht; Barker,
Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society (Cambridge, England,
1934), is an English version of part of 4 Gennossenschaftsrecht; Freyd, Otto
V. Gierke, The Development of Political Theory (New York, 1939), is an
English version of Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der Naturrecht-
lichen Staatstheorien.
11. History credits this Pope for a letter to the Bishops of France and
Germany, exonerating the Jews from the suspicion of indulging in ritual
murders, but charges him with having sanctioned the use of torture in the
examination of heretics. 2 Schulte, Die Geschichte der Quelien und Literatur
des Kanonischen Rechts (Stuttgart, 1887) 91; 14 Mann, The Lives of the
Popes in the Middle Ages (London, 1928) 17.
12. Published shortly after the Second Council of Lyons (1245). First
print in Strassburg, Germany, 1477; second print in Venice, Italy, 1481.
13. Writer's translation of the original (Latin) phrase: "cum collegium
in causa universitatis ftngatur una persona" the whole context of which is
quoted by Gillet, La Personnalit6 Juridique en Droit Eccl6siastique (Malines,
Belgium, 1927) 165. It is submitted that the key word "fingatur" in the above
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the question was raised whether a universitas14 could be hit by
the sanction of excommunication. The Pope's answer was in the
negative", and he justified his decision by stating: "since Cor-
poration as well as Chapter, Tribe, and so on, are legal terms
rather than names of persons."1 6
In an attempt to evaluate the importance of the above-quoted
two announcements of Innocent IV, the writer wishes to submit
the following two points. In the first-mentioned passage, the
Pope, by suggesting that a college should be imagined as a human
individual,17 recommended a device of legal technique whereby
certain practical problems could be solved in a convenient way,
namely, the treatment of a corporation as a separate legal entity.
While he thus opened the way for the restoration of the distinc-
tion between a societas or partnership and a universitas or cor-
poration, which had been familiar to the classic Roman law, but
was ignored by those of its medieval commentators whose teach-
ings crystallized in the famous Glossa,1 8 he went a step further
than the classic Roman law which had not yet known what he
invented, namely, the legal personification of corporate entity.
The idea was stimulated by him that law, by a dogmatic fiction,
could for certain legal purposes recognize a separate entity
which, though not being a human individual, would, like a
Latin passage does, in this specific connection, not mean "feigned" but "fig-
ured." Similarly, but not with specific reference to Innocent IV, but to the
early fiction theory in general, see Pollock, Principles of Contract (London,
1876) 81, and Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence (4 ed., London, 1918)
117.
14. This was the Roman law term closest to the modern conception of
a corporation.
15. This was a reversal of the previous law. For, according to a decretal
of Pope Gregory IX, issued in 1234, that is, before the Second Council of
Lyons, the sanction of excommunication was applicable also to corporations.
Smith, The Law of Associations (Oxford, 1914) 152.
16. Writer's translation of the original (Latin) passage: "quia universitas,
sicut est capitulum, populus, gens et haec nomina sunt juris et non person-
arum," the whole context of which, quoted by Gillet, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 121, 122, contains an additional phrase reading (writer's translation):
"moreover a corporation cannot possibly act in bad faith." The last mentioned
doctrine is of course discredited by the modern theory of representation in
tort. Smith, op. cit. supra note 15, at 58. Moreover, Innocent IV himself, on
another occasion, recognized even the idea of criminal responsibility of cor-
porations. Smith, op. cit. supra note 15, at 153, n. 1, and Levy, Criminal Re-
sponsibility Individual and International Law (1945) 12 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
313, 319.
17. It must, of course, not be forgotten that "person," at that time, was
still exclusively used as designation of the human individual.
18. The Glossa contained this passage: "universitas nihl aliud est, nisi
singuli homines qui ibi sunt." Writer's translation: "The corporation is noth-
ing else but the individuals of whom it is composed." Ruffini, La classifica-
zione delle persone giuridiche in Sinibaldo dei Fieschi (Innocenzo IV) ed in
Federico Carlo di Savigny, 2 Studii Giurdici Dedicati e Offerti a Francesco
Schupfer (Torino, Italy, 1898) 313, 320.
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human individual, be considered a separate rights and duties
bearing unit. However, as Innocent IV, by his first-quoted state-
ment, showed that he well understood the practical need of legal
technique for the conception of separate corporate entity, he re-
vealed by his second-quoted statement that he was also aware
of certain reasonable limitations inherent in such legal fiction.
Since the corporation could only be treated as if it were a human
being, but actually was no human being, law could not extend
the effect of the fiction to such matters in which the specific legal
measure was based upon the assumption of the existence of a
human soul in the affected subject. Therefore, he believed the
fiction could not be applied when the issue was whether the sanc-
tion of excommunication could be meted out to a corporation.
Irrespective of whether he was right or wrong-in this particular
decision, the Pope, by his second-quoted statement, became a
precursor of those American lawyers who centuries later estab-
lished that well-known principle which is usually referred to as
the doctrine of "disregard of corporate entity."'19
III. The case of Sutton's Hospital Revisited
In his write-up on the case of Sutton's Hospital,20 which like
most of his "reports" was an essay rather than a digest, Lord
Coke used the often quoted phrase: "the incorporation itself is
only in abstracto, and rests only in intendment and consideration
of the law."'2 1 Though Coke himself did not refer, in this discus-
sion, to "fiction" or "fictitious," his comments on that occasion
19. Wormser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporation
Problems (1927); Anderson, Limitations of the Corporate Entity: A Treatise
on the Law Relating to the Overriding of the Corporate Fiction (1931); Latty,
Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations: A Study in Stockholders' Liability
(1936) 5; Ballantine, Corporations: "Disregarding the Corporate Entity" as
a Regulatory Process (1943) 31 Calif. L. Rev. 426.
20. The case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Jac. 1612, 10 Co. Rep. 23a, 32a; 77
Eng. Rep. 960, 972, 973.
21. Obviously inspired by this phrase, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in The
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (U. S. 1819)
said: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law." Previously, in The Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 86 (U. S. 1809), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall referred
to "that invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a
corporation aggregate." But cf. the following passage from 1 Kyd, Treatise
on the Law of Corporations (London, 1793) 16: "A corporation is as visible
a body as an army; for though the commission or authority be not seen by
every one, yet the body, united by that authority, is seen by all but the blind:
When, therefore, a corporation is said to be invisible, that expression must be
understood of the right in many persons, collectively, to act as a corporation,
and then it is as visible in the eye of the law, as any other right whatever of
which natural persons are capable .. "
1949]
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are generally considered as the classic exposition of the "fiction
theory of the common law. '22
There is nothing contained in Coke's remarks which would
indicate that he should have challenged the reality of the separate
legal entity of a corporation. How could he have done it within a
discussion whereby he attempted to rationalize the holding of a
court that went to a great length toward upholding the legal
reality of a corporation for which theretofore only the franchise
had been granted but which had not yet been created. 23 Rather
was Coke's emphasis an essentially different one. Confusing, like
numerous other distinguished scholars, the organic personality
of the human being with its legal personality, and therefore con-
sidering legal personality as an attribute naturally inherent in the
human being, 24 he wished to stress, and especially in view of the
holding in the case of Sutton's Hospital, that the legal entity of a
corporation, its capacity as a separate rights and duties bearing
unit, was an artificial creation of the law, and as such independent
of the existence of a physical substratum. In this respect, there is
no substantial difference between his theory and the doctrine of
r~alit6 technique (technical reality) or rdalit6 juridique (legal
reality) expounded at a much later period by certain French
writers, 25 or by a modern English lawyer who states: "The legal
personality of a corporate body is not a fiction. . . .It is as real as
the legal personality of the individual human being ... the con-
ception of corporate personality expresses a juristic reality, that
22. Budington Du Bois, The English Business Company After the Bubble
Act 1720-1800 (1938) 86, states: ". . . the lawyers continued to repeat the
platitudes developed in earlier centuries and distilled in concentrated form
by Lord Coke." (Citing the case of Sutton's Hospital.)
23. The gist of one of the legal problems, posed by the case, was, it is
submitted, whether the corporation of a hospital to be founded could legally
exist before the physical existence of the hospital. The court answered in
the affirmative. Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation (1908) 21 Harv.
L. Rev. 305,. 306, thus summarizes the facts: The king, at the petition of
Sutton, had granted a charter for the purpose of incorporating the master
and governors of a hospital to be founded by Sutton. Sutton thereafter pur-
ported to convey land to such corporation. His heir contended that there
was no corporation, and that the conveyance was void, but the court held
both the incorporation and the deed to be valid.
Coke's report states in this connection:
"And as to the sixth objection, that till an hospital be founded no in-
corporation can be . . . it was answered that there was an hospital in potes-
tate .... And as to the creation of an incorporation an hospital potestate,
potentia, seu nomine sufflceth; as one may by letters patent be governor of
an army before there be an army .... And it is great reason that an hos-
pital, . . . in expectancy or intendment, or nomination, should be sufficient
to support the name of an incorporation when the incorporation itself is
only in abstracto, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law.
• 10 Co. Rep. 23a, 32a, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 972, 973.
24. Contra: supra note 4.
25. See, e.g., 1 Michoud, Personnalit6 Morale (3 ed., Paris, 1932) 70.
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is, a reality from the juristic point of view, nothing more and
nothing less."26
Lord Coke's learned disquisition on the case of Sutton's Hos-
pital is, indeed, less responsible for the fiction theory, as such,
than for one of its peculiar ingredients within the corporation
doctrine of the common law:2 the so-called franchise or conces-
sion theory.28 This idea, which has meanwhile become obsolete
in the Anglo-American law, ran somewhat like this: Since the
corporation was a legal rather than a natural creature, it could
not exist without an individual license for its creation, to be
granted by the legislative body which, in those early days, was
the king.2 9 Later on, an act of Parliament or, in the American
states, a so-called private statute, authorizing the establishment
of a specifically indicated corporation, took the place of a Royal
Charter. As a final development, statutes would in a general way,
that is, without reference to a specific corporation, fix in advance
the conditions under which corporations could be created with
validity before the law. When this stage was reached, the demise
of the franchise theory had become a fact. 0
IV. Savigny's Fiction Theory
When Otto von Gierke discovered the trace leading from the
so-called fiction theory of the juristic person back to the writings
of Pope Innocent IV, he also claimed a great similarity between
the Pope's pertinent propositions and those which were, centuries
later, expounded by the German scholar Savigny.31 Other scholar-
ly writers, challenging this part of Gierke's conclusions, alleged
26. Hallis, Corporate Personality (London, 1930) 240. Similarly, McGovney,
A Supreme Court Fiction (1945) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 867.
27. Early English cases only rarely refer to the fictitious entity of the
corporation. Note, however, Nabob of Arcot v. The East India Company
[1791] 3 Broc. C.C. 292, 303, 29 Eng. Rep. 544, 549, 550; Attorney General, Sir
R. Sawyer (for the king) in The King v. City of London [1681-1683] 8 Howell,
State Trials 1039, 1175.
28. According to Kent's definition, "A corporation is a franchise possessed
by one or more individuals . . . vested by the policy of the law with the
capacity of . .. acting in several respects, however numerous the association
may be, as a single individual." 2 Holmes' 12th edition of Kent, Commentaries
on American Law (1873) 335 (267).
29. Budington Du Bois, op. cit. supra note 22, at 87, states:
"It was the authority granted by the state through royal charter or act
of Parliament that was the distinguishing mark of the corporation to the
eighteenth century lawyers. Whatever fragment of coherent theory existed
relating to the business corporation was centered in that relatively frequently
appearing phrase, 'The corporation is the creature of the state'."
30. Note, however, that in Austria (before the Anschluss) a joint stock
company (Aktiengesellschaft) could not be constituted without a special
license (Konzession) by the government,
31. Gierke, 3 Genossenschaftsrecht, supra note 10, at 246.
1949]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
a fundamental difference between the Pope's construction of the
possibility of separate legal entity of a corporation and Savigny's
doctrine on the legal nature of juristic persons. 32 They are ap-
parently supported by the fact that "imagined person" could not
mean the same thing to Innocent IV on the one hand and Savigny
on the other hand. The denotation of the term "person" had con-
siderably changed in the span of time separating their respective
eras. In the medieval Pope's era, "person" still exclusively desig-
nated a human individual. At Savigny's time, "person" had al-
ready its present double denotation: it was not only a synonym
for a human individual, but could be used also in a larger sense,
that is, designating any rights and duties bearing unit or Rechts-
subjekt, be it a human individual or any other kind of separate
legal entity.3 3 Thus in the Pope's language, "imagined person"
meant an imagined human individual; in Savigny's language the
phrase could also refer to the imagination or fiction of a separate
legal entity, and thus indicate a denial of the reality of separate
legal entity other than that of the human individual. As a matter
of fact, quite a few scholars, mostly those who have read only quo-
tations from Savigny, as for instance his description of juristic
persons as "artificial subjects, conceived merely by our imagina-
tion,' '3 4 or who have read only superficially Savigny's pertinent
discussions, consider him an exponent of that school of thought
which denies the legal reality of juristic persons, especially of
corporations. So understood, his pertinent doctrine would cer-
tainly not be in accordance with the theories expounded by Pope
Innocent IV or Lord Coke, analyzed hereinabove. However, upon
careful perusal of Savigny's own statements on the subject, there
cannot be any doubt, it is submitted, that Maitland was right
when he wrote: "What we call the Bracket Theory or Expansible
Symbol Theory of the Corporation really stands in sharp con-
trast with the Fiction Theory as Savigny conceived it though
sometimes English writers seem to be speaking of one and think-
ing of the other. '
35
32. Smith, op. cit. supra note 15, at 58, and Appendix I, 152; Hohenlohe,
Papstrecht und Weltliches Recht (Innsbruck, Austria, 1925) 24; Brown, The
Canonical Juristic Personality (1927) 46; Gillet, op. cit. supra note 13, at 80,
121, 160; 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3 ed. 1927) 470; Dowdall,
The Word "Person" (1928) 106 The Church Quarterly (London) 229, 238.
It should be noted that Savigny himself did not indicate any hookup of his
theory with the writings of Innocent IV, though he discussed the Pope's
view concerning the inapplicability, to corporations, of the sanction of ex-
communication. 2 Savigny, op. cit. supra note 2, at 322.
33. Supra note 5.
34. 2 Savigny, op. cit. supra note 2, at 236.
35. Maitland's introduction to his English version of Gierke's Genossen-
[VOL. IX
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The abstract-philosophical garb of Savigny's observation on
the nature of the juristic person36 may be partly responsible for
the fact that he was so often misunderstood even by distinguished
readers. This is the essence of his pertinent propositions:
The purpose of law is to protect the liberty of mind inherent
in man. The original conception of a person or of a legal subject
is therefore identical with the conception of a human being. At
this stage, only a human being has the capacity of a separate
rights and duties bearing unit. However, this initial situation
may, in the course of development of positive law, be modified
in two ways. On the one hand, that capacity may, partly or in
toto, be taken away from a human being. On the other hand, the
capacity of separate legal entity may be given by rule of posi-
tive law, to something which is not a human being. If the last
mentioned thing happens, the artificial creation of a juristic
person has taken place.3 7 Such a person we call a juristic person
because it is a rights and duties bearing unit other than man."
By the term "juristic person" we express the fact that such en-
tity is a "person" only for practical purposes of the law.39 How-
ever, the capacities of thought and will are inherent only in
human beings. A juristic person, which is a legal construction,
can therefore not possess them.40
Did Savigny, by developing this theory, attempt to deny the
legal reality of the juristic person? It is believed that his own
writings clearly indicate an answer in the negative. What he
meant by his reference to the imagined nature of the juristic
person was not to deny its legal reality, but to emphasize its lack
of organic existence. It should be noted that in the German lan-
guage the term "fiction," or, in German spelling, "Fiktion," more
often than in the English language indicates something which
does not really exist. However, Savigny's theory on the juristic
person had with "fiction" in this sense nothing more to do, it is
schaftsrecht, op. cit. supra note 10, at XXIV. Similarly, Pollock, Has the
Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations? (1911) 27 L.Q.
Rev. 219, 223, n. 2.
36. Savigny was one of the founders of the so-called Historical School of
Law and his writings are in general representative of this specific approach
to legal problems. However, his doctrine on the juristic person was not re-
lated to the Historical School of Law, but due to the impact, upon his trend
of legal thought, of the philosophy of Kant and Kant's adepts. Binder, Das
Problem der Juristischen Persoenlichkeit (Leipzig, Germany, 1907) 10.
37. 2 Savigny, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.
38. Id. at 236.
39. Id. at 240.
40. 3 Savigny, op. cit. supra note 2, at 89.
1949]
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submitted, than French legal writers by referring to a "moral
person"' 41 intend to refer to morality or ethics.
V. John Austin's Theory and Similar Ones
According to the founder of the so-called analytical school of
jurisprudence, John Austin,42 a distinction should be made of
"persons properly so-called, from persons who are such by a fig-
ment, and for the sake of brevity of discourse." The first are
"physical or natural persons," the others "legal or fictitious per-
sons, ' '4 3 the reality of which he thus challenges: "All rights reside
in, and all duties are incumbent upon, physical or natural per-
sons. But by ascribing them to feigned persons, and not to the
physical persons whom they in truth concern, we are frequently
able to abridge our description of them. '44
Austin's theory found adherents among scholars both in Eng-
land and in the United States. One of his followers describes the
personality of the corporation as "a mere shorthand phrase. '45
Another believes that "the corporation as such is not even a
shade, or a ghost or a simulacrum," rather "a verbal symbol, a
mathematical expression. '4 6
Similar ideas were, probably without any intellectual loan
from Austin and certainly in a most original form, developed by
the great legal historian and philosopher, Rudolf von Ihering. Ac-
cording to him, it is not the juristic person as such, but the indi-
viduals behind it to whom the rights really belong, which ex-
ternally appear as rights of the juristic person.47 On another oc-
casion he says: "The property of the juristic person, which exists
in our imagination, is an empty shell since its advantages are not
enjoyed by itself, but by those individuals for the benefit of whom
it exists, that is its beneficiaries. What appears as property of the
41. Their favorite technical term for the conception of a juristic person.
Supra note 6.
42. He died in 1867.
43. Note the similarity of Austin's term "legal person" with Savigny's
"juristic person." Quaere: was there any kind of intellectual contact be-
tween them? On the effect of Austin's study in Germany upon the develop-
ment of his ideas: Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America (1938)
1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 1, 7.
44. The quotations in the text are from I Campbell's fifth edition of
Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (Lon-
don, 1911) 347, 354.
45. Baty, The Nationality and Domicile of Corporations (1917) 2 Inter-
national Law Notes 133, 135.
46. Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality (1932) 32 Col.
L. Rev. 643, 658.




juristic person is merely a device of legal construction, convenient
for practical purposes of law, but with a nominal rather than a
real owner. Since the juristic person does not hold rights in its
own interest, it cannot be their real owner. Rather are its bene-
ficiaries those who really own those rights, as the Roman law
recognized by its institution of the actio popularis. ' '48
A proposition, admittedly stimulated by the just-mentioned
casual observations of Ihering, was elaborated in two books by
the French lawyer De Vareilles-Sommi~res. According to him,
the juristic person is an abstract entity of an utterly fictitious
nature, created by law in order to integrate and better protect
rights actually belonging to individual physical persons.49
Even more radical than Ihering's idea- that the beneficiaries
are the real owners of the property of a juristic person, is Alois
Brinz' famous theory of Zweckvermoegen (Purpose-Property).
According to him, lawyers have no more need for a juristic person
than zoologists have to do with scarecrows.5 Again according to
him, to speak of a juristic person makes no more sense than to
describe "our Darwinian cousins" as persons.' Instead of taking
recourse to unrealistic personifications, lawyers should frankly
admit that there is such a thing as a property belonging to no
person, rather devoted to a certain purpose, a Zweckvermoegen. 2
It is not felt necessary to submit critical comments on each
of the foregoing four theories, that is of Austin, Ihering, De
Vareilles-Sommi~res and Brinz. They may be covered in a single
general appraisal, since they are representative of one common
trend.5 3 All of them, in challenging the reality of juristic persons,
do this in a manner which places them on the opposite pole from
the extremest doctrine affirming that reality: Gierke's so-called
organic theory, to be discussed herein below. While Gierke claims
48. Writer's free translation of 1 Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht (2 ed.,
Leipzig, 1884) 469.
49. De Vareilles, Sommi~res, La Synth~se de Droit International Priv6
(Paris, 1887) 43, and Les Personnes Morales (Paris, 1902) 147.
50. 1 Brinz, Lehrbuch, der Pendekten (Erlangen, Germany, 1857) xi.
51. 1 Brinz, Lehrbuch der Pandekten (2 ed., Erlangen, Germany, 1873)
199.
52. Id. at 194, 201, 202. Contra: Stammler, Theorie der Rechtswissen-
schaft (Halle, Germany, 1911) 356. Note also that if Brinz' theory were cor-
rect this would in Anglo-American law mean the obliteration of the difference
between the conceptions of corporations on the one hand, trust on the other
hand.
53. Smith, Legal Personality (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 283; Stevens, Handbook
of the Law of Private Corporations (1936) vii. Contra: Latty, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 26, stating: ". . . the theory of a corporation as a fiction . ..
exists only in picturesque dicta; our law has not taken the view that the
corporation is but an ethereal whiff-at least it is admitted all around that
there are' some things about a corporation that are not pure fiction."
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that juristic persons are more than merely legal realities, that
they are in addition organic realities, the above-mentioned full-
fledged fictionalists, as we propose to call them, deny not only
the organic existence but even the legal existence of juristic per-
sons, that is, even the truth of the allegation that they are sepa-
rate legal entities, or separate rights and duties bearing units.
The fullfledged fictionalists, it is herewith submitted, are in
their corporation theories involved in the same kind of error,
though with a reversed practical effect, as was inherent in the
association theories of noted exponents of the so-called Natural
School of Law. The latter, ignoring the legal distinction between
the conceptions of partnership on the one hand, corporation on
the other hand, treated each association as a separate legal per-
sonality.54 Contrariwise, the fullfiedged fictionalists, substantially
if not in terms, consider each corporation as a partnership. How-
ever, definite rules of positive law, respectively applicable either
only to partnerships or only to corporations, prohibit such a
merger.
To be sure, a given system of law can do without the con-
ception or device of a juristic person, especially of a corporation.55
Moreover, even if it possesses that device, it need not couple it
with a terminological personification of the separate corporate
entity, but may continue to reserve the term "person" for human
individuals.' Again, even a system of law which ascribes sepa-
rate legal entity to things different from human individuals need
not apply this technical device with such a logical consistency
as to reach a breaking point, from a pragmatic viewpoint, but
54. The Natural School of Law merged the conception of partnership
with that of corporation by treating each association as a "moral," that Is, a
juristic person. The impact of this trend is clearly visible in the Austrian
Civil Code (1811), the chief draftsman of which, Professor Franz Zeiler of
the University of Vienna, was strongly addicted to the Natural School of
Law. Wellspacher, Das Naturrecht und das ABGB, in 1 Festschrift zur
Jahrhundertfeier des Allgemeinen Buergerlichen Gesetzbuchs (Vienna, 1911)
173.
55. It would seem to be doubtful whether the conception of separate
corporate entity existed in the Year Book period of the common law. Ching
Wang, The Corporate Entity Concept (or Fiction Theory) in the Year Book
Period (1942) 58 L.Q. Rev. 498 and (1943) 99 L.Q. Rev. 72.
56. Supra note 5. In the Roman law, which clearly distinguished a part-
nership (societas) from a corporation (universitas), the latter was not called
a person. The Latin word "persona" originally designated the mask which
the actor put on in order to indicate thereby the man In the play whom he
represented on the scene. By a conversion of meaning which is rather fre-
quent in the development of languages, the term "persona" came to indicate
the human being represented by the actor, and at an even later phase, any
human individual. The still further development that "person" may indicate
both a human individual and also another unit constituting a separate legal
entity was not reached by the Romans.
[VOL. IX
PERSON IN IMAGINATION
may limit its effect so as to keep it in harmony with the practical
purposes of law.5 7 Finally, the civil law systems know certain
types of associations, legal hybrids as it were, which are only
for certain specified purposes regarded as separate legal entities,
but in other respects looked upon as mere aggregates of several
individuals. 58
There is nevertheless a fundamental mistake involved in the
theories which deny the reality, even as a matter of law, of a
juristic person. To the extent to which a given law rules that a
certain thing should be treated as a separate legal entity, it is,
as a matter of law, just not possible to challenge its real existence
as a separate rights and duties bearing unit. A rule of positive law
will never abdicate before an injunction of abstract speculation.
There are certain hurdles in the rules of positive law before which
philosophical ideas of a conceptualistic brand must necessarily
stop.
Joseph Kohler was certainly right, though perhaps too acri-
monious in his following statement: "The question whether the
juristic person is real or imaginary should never have been seri-
ously advanced. It is a reality in the law like every reality cre-
ated by the law. It is not a human being of flesh and blood. Old
and new absurdities that testify to the failure to comprehend
this need not be considered. 59
VI. Gierke's Organic Theory of the Corporation
Otto von Gierke, impressed by the so-called Genossen-
schaftstheorie of his teacher in Berlin, George Beseler, devoted
his own scholarly research to this mainly historical topic, and in
this connection developed his "organic theory" on the nature of
corporate entities.60 The substance of his proposition is a sociolo-
gical supplement to the doctrine of legal reality of the juristic
person.6' His specific contribution is his claim that the legal per-
sonality of the corporation is superimposed upon an organic unit
existing in human society irrespective of and before its acknowl-
edgment as a separate legal entity.62 According to Gierke him-
57. Supra note 19. What is called "disregard of corporate entity" is, it
should be noted, not a disregard of it, but a limitation of its practical effects.
58. E.g., the type of commercial association which is called socW6td en nom
collectif in the French law and Offene Handelsgeselsehaft in the German law.
59. Op. cit. supra note 7.
60. "There is no topic in juristic literature which has made a greater
noise in the schools or in the world." Freyd, Gierke and the Corporate Myth
(1938) 4 Journal of Social Philosophy 158.
61. Supra notes 25, 26.
62. Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht, op. cit. supra note 10, at 471.
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self, his organic theory considers the state and other associations
as social organisms,6 3 thus claiming the existence of collective
organisms beyond and above the individual organisms.0 4 In addi-
tion to the will of the individual there exists, he maintains, a col-
lective will incorporated in various social units which become
juristic persons the moment they are recognized as separate legal
entities.6 The collective personality is, he explains, the capacity
of an association to be a rights and duties bearing unit, as such
different, of course, from a mere aggregate of several individ-
uals.6 He expressly states that the collective person is like the
individual person, a real rather than an imaginary entity, even
though its legal status, again like that of the individual person, is
derived from a rule of law. 7 The gist of his organic theory, as he
himself summarizes it, is his conception of the corporation as a
collective unit existing in reality rather than as a phantom or
fiction.68
Gierke himself warned against antropomorphic misrepre-
sentations of his theory.69 He was on sound sociological ground
when he emphasized the existence of social organisms as an ele-
mentary fact of human society.70 However, this observation does
not add substantially to the legal analysis of the corporate per-
sonality.71 Moreover, it is subject to an important qualification.
Under a given system of law, a separate legal entity, other than
the human individual, may be established without the substratum
of an existing social organism. 7 2 On the other hand, a given sys-
tem of law may not yet have achieved the technical capacity of
assigning separate legal entity to a social organism. Legal per-
sonality is thus far from being an adjunct of the organic exis-
tence of a social body. It is a legal phenomenon, resting on a
completely different plane from the sociological phenomenon
highlighted by Gierke's organic theory.
63. The main characteristic of organisms, according to Gierke, is their
unity in plurality. Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons (1938) 54 L.Q. Rev.
494, 500.
64. Gierke, Das Wesen der Menschlichen Verbaende, op. cit. supra note
10, at 13.
65. Gierke, Juristische Person, op. cit. supra note 10, at 847.
66. 1 Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht, op. cit. supra note 10, at 469.
67. Id. at 470.
68. Gierke, Die Genossenschaftstheorie, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5.
69. Gierke, Das Wesen der Menschlichen Verbaenie, op. cit. supra note
10, at 14.
70. Vinogradoff, Juridicial Persons (1924) 24 Co. L. Rev. 594, 604; Cardozo,
The Paradoxes of Legal Science (New York, 1928) 93; 2 Roguin, La Science
Juridique Pure (Paris, 1923) especially at 435. But cf. MacIver, The Modern
State (Oxford, 1926) 473, 474.
71. Freun, The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897) 14.
72. The best illustration is probably the so-called one-man company.




The end has been reached of our critical bird's eye view of
the most important doctines on the nature of corporate person-
ality. The purpose was to survey within the compass of a short
article a field which is covered by an almost prohibitive volume
of literature. This naturally imposed rigid limitations on the se-
lection of material thought to be representative of certain trends
of jurisprudential analysis. It is nevertheless hoped that enough
has been presented to serve as an initial briefing on a topic which
was always a favorite of legal writers.
By approaching the subject matter from a historical angle,
the attempt could be made to show that "corporate person" or
"juristic person" in general was only so long a metaphoric con-
ception and in this limited sense something fictional as the pri-
mary meaning of the term "person" was limited to a designation
of the individual physical being. This stage was abandoned, how-
ever, when the term "person" was so amplified in its meaning as
to include even in a non-metaphoric sense any separate legal en-
tity or rights and duties bearing unit (Rechtssubjekt), whether
it be an individual physical person or an association or a social
organism or a social institution.
Once this point was reached, the originally pragmatic device
of legal technique to refer to the corporation or to the juristic
person by way of calling it a fictitious person or persona ficta
had become obsolete and began to create confusion in certain
fields of law, especially in American constitutional law and in
international law, rather than to promote sound legal develop-
ment. Correctly understood, "persona ficta" can nowadays hardly
be anything else than a synonym for "corporate person." Suppose
we do away with that cryptic phrase altogether rather than let
modern law be further haunted by a ghost from the realm of
medieval philosophy of law? It does not serve any practical pur-
pose, but constitutes a permanent temptation to speculations
about the reality or unreality of corporate personality which,
nowadays, have no more sense than speculations about the reality
or unreality of the conception of property or of other established
institutions of a legal nature. All of them are, of course, based
upon a given system of law, but within the thus ordered society
they are as real as the morning sun or the evening star.
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